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LAW OF THE CASE IN NEVADA:
CONFUSING RELATIVES
Scott Doney*
Law of the case belongs to the family of preclusion doctrines including,
collateral estoppel, res judicata, and stare decisis. 1 Under the law of the case
doctrine, when an issue is decided in a particular case, the parties of that case
cannot relitigate the same issue in any subsequent proceeding.' For example,
consider Lenny, a defendant in a criminal case who is convicted of murder and
decides to appeal an evidentiary ruling of the trial judge. Once the appellate
court decides that particular issue on appeal, Lenny cannot relitigate that same
issue in a petition for post-conviction relief in the trial court below, or in any
further proceeding in the appellate court. The decision of the first appeal
becomes the "law of the case" precluding further consideration of that issue.
The purpose of the doctrine is to ensure efficient resolution of issues.3 Once a
court decides a legal issue, it is generally "inefficient" to reconsider that issue.4
"Simplicity is achieved by narrowing the scope of review" of issues presented
to courts in subsequent proceedings. 5
Jurisdictions vary on how strictly they apply the doctrine. Some jurisdic-
tions absolutely refuse to consider an issue once decided regardless of the rea-
son.6 This Note refers to this view as the "no power theory," meaning the court
has no power to reconsider the issue.7 Hence the nickname, "the right or wrong
doctrine," signifying adherence to the prior ruling even though the court
believes the ruling was wrongfully decided.8 In other jurisdictions, the doctrine
is less strict, providing departures in certain circumstances.9 These jurisdic-
tions reject the no power theory in favor of correcting a possible erroneous
outcome. 10
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Joan Steinman, Law of the Case: A Judicial Puzzle In Consolidated and Transferred
Cases and in Multidistrict Litigation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 598 (1987).
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State, 44 MD. L. REv. 177, 180 (1985).
1 Brett T. Parks, McDonald's Corp. v. Hawkins and "The Law of the Case" Doctrine in
Arkansas, 50 ARK. L. REV. 127, 136-37 (1997).
4 Steinman, supra note 1, at 602.
5 Parks, supra note 3, at 127.
6 E.H. Schopler, Erroneous Decision As Law of the Case On Subsequent Appellate Review,
87 A.L.R.2d 271, §§ 3(a), 6 (1999).
7 Wright v. Carson Water Co., 39 P. 872, 874 (Nev. 1895).
8 Parks, supra note 3, at 136.
9 Schopler, supra note 6, § 3(a).
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Depending on the particular view adopted, courts compare their interpreta-
tion of law of the case to a related preclusion doctrine." Some courts explain
law of the case as res judicata; other courts explain law of the case as stare
decisis.' 2 Law of the case is related to stare decisis because both entail con-
formity of law to prior decisions: law of the case applying to the immediate
case between the parties, and stare decisis covering any future case as well.' 3
Another commonality between the two is the principle of departure, which per-
mits courts to overrule erroneous decisions.' 4
Res judicata' 5on the other hand, is generally not subject to departure prin-
ciples.' 6 Law of the case also differs from res judicata because it lacks the
"necessary to the judgment" standard required by res judicata.' 7 Law of the
" Parks, supra note 3, at 130-31 (comparing law of the case with res judicata, collateral
estoppel, and stare decisis) (for examples of cases dealing with these issues, see the endnotes
on these pages). Res judicata holds that a party may only sue on a single claim once. Collat-
eral estoppel prevents relitigation of issues litigated and decided in the first case. Finally,
stare decisis, also known as the doctrine of precedent, requires that all future decisions fol-
low a particular rule of law set forth by an appellate court. RICHARD D. FREER & WENDY C.
PURDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, AND QUESTIONS 647-48 (2d ed. 1997). For
an historical perspective concerning the family of preclusion doctrines, see SPENCER BOWER,
THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA (1924).
12 See Schopler, supra note 6, § ](a) (discussing cases that mesh law of the case with the
preclusion doctrines res judicata and stare decisis).
13 Parks, supra note 3, at 131.
'4 Steinman, supra note 1, at 599 n. 10; Greene v. Rothschild, 402 P.2d 356 (Wash. 1966).
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, the court is not obligated to perpetrate its own errors. This
doctrine means that the rule laid down in any particular case is applicable to another case involv-
ing identical or substantially similar facts .... We see no reason why this principle should not
apply where the allegedly erroneous decision is one which was rendered on a prior appeal of the
same case.
Id.
15 Throughout this note, res judicata will refer to both res judicata and collateral estoppel.
Res judicata actually encompasses both doctrines. Citizens for Prot. of N. Kohala Coastline
v. County of Hawaii, 979 P.2d 1120, 1128 (Haw. 1999); In re the Marriage of Mallon, 956
P.2d 642, 644 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998); In re Estate of Hinderliter, 882 P.2d 1001, 1004 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1994); Babcock v. State, 768 P.2d 481, 486-87 (Wash. 1989).
16 FREER & PURDUE, supra note 11, at 648-49; Schopler, supra note 6, § 3(a) ("There is a
difference between the principle of the law of the case and the doctrine of res judicata: the
former 'directs discretion,' the latter 'supersedes it and compels judgment'; in other words,
the latter is 'a question of power,' the former one 'of submission.'") (citing S.R. Co. v. Clift,
260 U.S. 316, 319 (1922) to discuss the difference between res judicata and law of the case);
Greene v. Rothschild, 402 P.2d 356 (Wash. 1966) (distinguishing res judicata, a "uniform
rule," from law of the case, a "discretionary rule") (citing United States v. U.S. Smelting
Refining & Mining Co., 339 U.S. 186 (1950)). The Ninth Circuit, in Moore v. Jas. H.
Matthews & Co., 682 F.2d 830, 833-34 (9th Cir. 1982), provided that:
[t]he law of the case principle is analogous to, but less absolute a bar than, res judicata. [citation
omitted]. Although the law of the case rule does not bind a court as absolutely as res judicata,
and should not be applied "woodenly" when doing so would be inconsistent with "considerations
of substantial justice," ... the discretion of a court to review earlier decisions should be exer-
cised sparingly so as not to undermine the salutory policy of finality that underlies the rule.
Id.
'7 Steinman, supra note 1, at 598 n.8; Harris v. Harris, 591 P.2d 1147, 1148 n.1 (Nev. 1979)
(describing the "essential to the judgment" element under collateral estoppel); Clark v.
Clark, 389 P.2d 69, 71 (Nev. 1964) (stating that under collateral estoppel an issue must be
"necessarily determined").
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case may apply to any issue presented, deliberated, and decided while res judi-
cata requires a decisive issue. 8 For this reason, res judicata is more narrowly
applied. '9
The preclusion doctrine to which courts relate law of the case is significant
to litigants. An example illustrates this significance. Consider Lenny, the con-
victed murderer who appealed his conviction. The appellate court decided
against his claim of error on the evidentiary ruling in the trial court. Suppose
on that issue, the court decided that hearsay is admissible if the hearsay is a
victim's written statement about the defendant. Suppose, however, the same
court heard that issue again only a year later, in a different case, and held to the
contrary - a victim's written statement about the defendant is hearsay and inad-
missible. Meanwhile, after hearing the outcome of this case, Lenny filed a
second appeal again raising the issue of the victim's written statement. Facing
these contradictory opinions, the court must decide how to treat Lenny's second
appeal.
Whether law of the case operates like stare decisis or res judicata is vital in
this hypothetical. If law of the case operates like stare decisis, the court may
recognize the erroneous conclusion and reconsider Lenny's issue. On the other
hand, if the law of the case operates like res judicata, the court would simply
estopp Lenny from raising the issue.
This note argues that law of the case in Nevada should operate more like
stare decisis than the other preclusion doctrines and allow for instances of
departure from prior rulings. Currently this is not so. In Nevada, "[t]he law of
the first appeal is the law of the case on all subsequent appeals in which the
facts are substantially the same."2 ° Moreover, the Nevada Supreme Court
claims it has no power to revisit prior issues already decided.2 ' Hence, even if
the prior ruling is erroneous, no longer sound, or might work a manifest injus-
tice, the court refuses to reconsider the issue.22 In Nevada, law of the case is
treated like res judicata.2 3 Law of the case, however, should be treated like
stare decisis; the court should have the discretionary power to overrule.
If Nevada's version of law of the case is applied to Lenny's situation, he
loses miserably. Even if the Nevada Supreme Court openly admitted that its
prior decision was wrong, it could not entertain the issue on Lenny's second
appeal since it claims to have no power to do so. Also unfortunate is the fact
that the court's intervening ruling, which changed precedent under the second
appeal, will not be applied to Lenny's case for the same reason. Both of these
results are unfair to Lenny.
Part One of this Note tracks law of the case as it developed in Nevada and
discusses why the court adopted the no power theory. The history of law of the
case in Nevada illustrates the inconsistencies prevalent in the doctrine. Part
Is Compare Clark, 389 P.2d at 71, with State v. Loveless, 150 P.2d 1015, 1017-18 (Nev.
1944).
19 Id.
20 Hall v. State, 535 P.2d 797, 798 (Nev. 1975).
21 Loveless, 150 P.2d at 1017 (quoting Walker v. State, 455 P.2d 34, 38 (Nev. 1969)).
22 The litigant's only recourse lies in a petition for rehearing, which, for all intents and
purposes, is meaningless in the above hypothetical. See id. at 1017; NEV. R. App. P. 40.
23 Cartan v. David, 4 P. 61, 65 (Nev. 1884).
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Two summarizes the main elements of Nevada law of the case doctrine, then
offers a critique of the Nevada approach, which highlights some of these incon-
sistencies and provides an alternative approach.
I. LAW OF THE CASE IN NEVADA: THE FOUNDATIONAL CASES
Interestingly, in early Nevada law, the Nevada Supreme Court had the
opportunity to treat law of the case like stare decisis. Instead, the court chose
to adopt the no power theory.
A. Linn v. Minor
The 1869 case, Linn v. Minor,24 was one of the first cases to discuss stare
decisis in Nevada. In this case, the court was called upon to consider (1)
whether a particular act of the Nevada legislature was repugnant to an act of
Congress, and (2) if not, whether the court should overrule cases that say the
Nevada act is repugnant to the act of Congress. On the first issue, the court
found that the Nevada act was not repugnant to the Congressional act.2 1 It
therefore, with some reservation, overruled prior cases that said otherwise.
"[A] decision once made upon due deliberation ought not to be disturbed by the
same Court, except upon the most cogent reasons and upon undoubted manifes-
tation of error.",2 6 The court discussed the need for the finality of the issue, yet
argued that finality and stability of the law should sometimes capitulate to pro-
gress in the law.27 "[E]ven this backwardness to interfere with previous adjudi-
cations does not require us to shut our eyes upon all improvements in the
science of the law, or require us to be stationary while all around us is in pro-
gress."'28 Ripe before the court was the struggle between finality of decision
and correctness of decision. The court did not employ a rule that unduly
restricted its review of these competing principles, but rather, the court pre-
ferred treating these cases on an ad hoc basis.2 9 "Circumstances of each partic-
ular case . . . whether it may only be doubtful or clearly against principle,
whether sustained by some authority or opposed to all: these are all matters to
be judged of whenever the Court is called on to depart from a prior
determination."3
The court's foregoing admonition necessarily includes law of the case.
The court, however, did not heed the admonition. Instead, it chose to restrict its
power to revisit an issue already decided.
A few years later, in Winston,"' the petitioner sought relief from his con-
viction of gaming on the Lord's Day. The petitioner argued that a law passed
in 1869 repealed an 1861 law that empowered criminal prosecution for gaming
24 4 Nev. 462 (1869).
25 Id. at 463.
26 Id. at 465-66.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 466.
29 Id. at 466-67.
30 Id. (emphasis added).
31 9 Nev. 71 (1873).
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on the Lord's Day.3 2 The court held that the petitioner's writ for habeas corpus
was not the same as a writ of error.3 3 The justice of the peace, by expressed
provisions, had jurisdictional authority to determine whether the 1869 law
repealed the 1861 law.34 Having found that it did not, the appropriate remedy
for petitioner was a writ of error to the district court, not a re-determination of
the issue already decided by a competent magistrate with jurisdictional
power.35 "The judgment of a court of record, whose jurisdiction is final, is as
conclusive on all the world as the judgment of this Court would be." 36 The
court held that a habeas corpus petition to the Nevada Supreme Court is tanta-
mount to asking the court to rehear that legal issue. Law of the case precluded
revisitation because the court "ha[d] no power to say whether it is right or
wrong."3 7
By restricting its power to revisit issues, the court threw a blanket of
approval over past decisions whether rightly or wrongly decided. The "right or
wrong" view of law of the case is a public policy notion rooted in principles of
finality and efficiency.38 As such, law of the case in Nevada drifted from its
brother stare decisis and followed its cousin res judicata.3 9 In State v. Consoli-
dated Virginia Mining Co.,40 the appellant argued that the doctrine better
resembles res judicata than stare decisis because it is not triggered by strength
or correctness of argument, but by applicability of estoppel principles to bar
successive issues. 41 Two years later, in Cartan v. David,42 the Nevada
Supreme Court deemed law of the case - "res judicata between the . . .
parties.
B. Wright v. Carson Water Co.
Before 1895, the court failed to articulate with any depth, its reasons and
policies for adopting a stricter construction than called for in Linn v. Minor.
This all changed with the seminal cases - Wright v. Carson Water Co. I" and
Wright v. Carson Water Co. H.45 In the original case of Wright v. Carson
Water Co. [hereinafter Wright I], Wright brought an action in the Nevada
courts to enforce a promissory note allegedly executed by the president and
secretary of Carson Water Co.46 The trial court, in a bench trial, awarded
32 Id.
33 Id. at 75.
34 Id. at 76.
35 Id. at 78.
36 Id. at 76.
37 Id. at 75.
38 Parks, supra note 3, at 136-37.
31 Id. at 131 n.36; Allen D. Vestal, Law of the Case: Single-Suit Preclusion, 12 UTAH L.
REv. 1, 2 (1967) (referring to law of the case as twin brother of stare decisis).
40 16 Nev. 432 (Nev. 1882).
41 Id. at 432.
42 4 P. 61 (Nev. 1884).
43 Id. at 65.
4 39 P. 872 (Nev. 1895) [hereinafter Wright I].
45 42 P. 196 (Nev. 1895) [hereinafter Wright H].
46 Wright 1, 39 P. at 873.
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Wright judgment on the note.47 The district court granted a new trial and
Wright's estate (Wright was by then deceased) appealed.48  The Nevada
Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the district court.49 In the second trial,
this time by jury, Carson Water Co. moved to exclude the note from evi-
dence.5 ° The trial court excluded the note and Wright's estate appealed the
judgment.5
Wright argued that since a witness did not testify in the second trial they
should be allowed to reargue the issue of the note's validity.52 The court found
that the issue was "properly presented, argued, and contested on the former
hearing. 53 Furthermore, the decision "went to the essence of the case."54
After establishing that the doctrine is applicable to a distinct set of facts adjudi-
cated between distinct parties, the court addressed the binding nature of the
prior decision on all future decisions:
[T]he law of the case [is] not only binding on the parties and their privies, but on the
court below and on this court itself. A ruling of an appellate court upon a point
distinctly made upon a previous appeal is, in all subsequent proceedings in the same
case upon substantially the same facts, a final adjudication, from the consequences of
which the court cannot depart. The supreme court has no power to review its own
judgments in the same case, except upon petition for rehearing, in accordance for the
rules established for the purpose. Such are the decisions of more than two hundred
cases, decided in more than thirty states of the Union, besides a great number of the
federal courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States.
5 5
Important to note from this excerpt is that the court reaffirmed its no
power stance regarding revisitation of issues. 56 It adopted this construction
from the majority view at the time, as outlined in a book by Herman entitled,
Estoppel and Res Judicata.5 7 This book indicates that some two hundred
cases favored the no power theory.58
The Nevada Supreme Courts' fixation on this construction will be shown
in later cases throughout the twentieth century until today.5 9 This occurred
despite the fact that many of the jurisdictions Nevada relied upon in Wright I
abandoned the no power theory.60
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 id. at 873-74.
56 See Ex parte Winston, 9 Nev. 71 (1873).
57 Wright 1, 39 P. at 874 (citing HERMAN ON ESTOPPEL AND RES JUDICATA).
58 Id.
59 See State v. Loveless, 150 P.2d 1015, 1017 (Nev. 1944); Sherman Gardens Co. v. Long-
ley, 491 P.2d 48 (Nev. 1971); Emeterio v. Clint Hurt and Assoc., Inc., 967 P.2d 432 (Nev.
1998).
6 For example, the federal circuits and the U.S. Supreme Court abandoned this view.
United States v. Paquette, 201 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 2000); Counsel of Alternative Political Par-
ties v. Hooks, 179 F.3d 64 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Aramony, 166 F.3d 655 (4th Cir.
1998); Gates v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 881 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1989); Holloway v. Brush, 220
F.3d 767 (6th Cir. 2000); Creek v. Vill. of Westhaven, 144 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 1998); Little
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In the sequel, Wright v. Carson Water Co. [hereinafter Wright II],
Wright's estate filed a petition for rehearing to the Nevada Supreme Court
arguing that the second appeal disclosed a different set of facts from the set of
facts disclosed on the first appeal.6 1 The court evidently found the basis for its
decision concerning the note, which it skimmed over in Wright I, and went into
depth on the ratification process to form an implied contract absent express
authorization of corporate board members.6" The court held that law of the
case precluded revisitation of the issue because the new alleged facts, immate-
rial at best, related to decisive issues presented in the first appeal.6 3
In his dissent, Chief Justice Bigelow criticized the majority's decision
concerning law of the case on two points. First, he asserted that law of the case
only binds decisive issues presented before the court, not dicta.64 On the first
appeal, the decisive factor was review of the district court's grant of a new
trial.65 Conversely, the decisive factor presented in the second appeal was the
court's ruling on an evidentiary matter.66 He, therefore, found the decision on
the first appeal was "uncalled-for expressions of opinion" not binding in the
second appeal.67 Second, he stated that whether the corporation's conduct
amounted to an implied contract was a question of fact for the jury to decide.68
"It is upon questions of law, and not upon questions of fact, that the decision of
the court becomes law of the case."' 6 9 Evidence surrounding the validity of the
note should not be precluded by law of the case, when appellants are arguing
mutated facts.7 °
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
Not much has changed in the years following the Wright cases. The court
has worked on fine-tuning the doctrine. The heated discussion about applying
the doctrine lingered and although the court started making exceptions, it left
the rule essentially intact.
Earth of United Tribes, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 807 F.2d 1433 (8th Cir.
1986); Coleman v. Calderon, 210 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2000); Greene v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
210 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2000); Royal Ins. Co. v. Latin Am. Aviation Serv., Inc., 210 F.3d
1348 (11 th Cir. 2000); Gould, Inc. v. United States, 67 F.3d 925 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Kimberlin
v. Quinlan, 199 F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983).
61 Note that the court is revisiting its decision in Wright I because of the nature of the
petition. This is not a subsequent appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court, but a petition for
rehearing. In Wright I, the court allowed revisitation of issues upon a petition for rehearing.
39 P. at 874.
62 Wright H, 42 P. 196, 197-98 (Nev. 1895).
63 Id. at 198.
6 Id. at 200 (Bigelow, C.J., dissenting).
65 Id. at 200-01.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 200.
68 Id. at 201.
69 Id.
70 Id.
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
A. Law of the Case & Dictum
One important mid-century case discussed the posture of law of the case
on issues of dicta. In State v. Loveless,71 the jury convicted the defendant of
murder.72 The defense appealed the judgment, and the Nevada Supreme Court
reversed sua sponte rather than by points brought on appeal.7 3 The court
refuted, in all respects, the points raised by the defense.7 ' The jury again con-
victed the defendant on the identical charge, and again the defense appealed.75
This time, in conjunction with oral argument, the state moved to strike points
made by the defense on the first appeal. 76 The defense responded by arguing
that issues rejected in the first opinion were merely dictum, as the court ulti-
mately raised the decisive issue, and should be heard again.7 7 In response to
the defense's claim, the court defined obiter dictum as "an opinion expressed
by a Judge on a point not necessarily arising in a case."7 8 Such issues relate to
"some point not discussed at bar."' 79 Distinguished are those types of issues for
which actual questions were raised in the former appeal which "the court delib-
erately considered and decided."8 ° Since issues were briefed, argued, deliber-
ated upon, and decided in the first appeal, they were not obiter dictum and
therefore amenable to law of the case.8 1 This was true despite the fact that
reversal occurred on different grounds.82 The issues decided on the first appeal
were necessary "to establish the law of the case on all points involved, and for
the guidance of the lower court."83
Necessarily then, some dictum binds a subsequent appeal. True, obiter
dictum will not carry authority to the next appeal, and hence is not part of law
of the case. However, judicial dictum will. While obiter dictum relates to col-
lateral matters not raised on appeal, judicial dictum relates to questions raised
and decided on appeal albeit having no bearing on the outcome of the case.84
Logically, issues decided by an appellate court must transmit to the lower court
as mandatory authority for guidance purposes.8 If so, then the same issues
ought to bind any subsequent appeal.
71 150 P.2d 1015 (Nev. 1944).
72 Id. at 1016.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Chief Justice Bigelow argued similarly. See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
78 150 P.2d at 1018.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 See Lanigir v. Arden, 450 P.2d 148 (Nev. 1969) (holding that the issue raised on the
second appeal is not precluded because it was only indirectly mentioned in the first appeal,
and the issue was not "specified" as error); Sherman Gardens Co. v. Longley, 491 P.2d 48
(Nev. 1971) (holding that the trial court cannot imply from the previous opinion "law of the
case" unless the issue was presented, considered, and deliberately decided).
85 This is probably the most valuable component of the doctrine. If a district or trial court
on remand were able to sidestep the higher courts instructions, chaos would ensue. This
occurrence, interestingly, is not infrequent. See, e.g., LoBue v. State, 554 P.2d 258 (Nev.
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Stare decisis differs from law of the case because it arguably implicates
neither type of dictum. In other words, only decisive issues would fall under
stare decisis analysis. Law of the case, on the other hand, abounds under judi-
cial dictum and the decisive issue in the case. Therefore, law of the case tends
to be broader in application. Loveless, however, changed this distinction:
We are aware that it has been held that judicial dictum is not of equal binding force
as an authority, as the point on which the decision of the case turned. But we think
this is a rule too rigid to be recognized as the law of this jurisdiction .... "So it has
been held, with respect to a court of last resort, that all that is needed to render its
decision authoritative is that there was an application of the judicial mind to the
precise question adjudged; and that the point was investigated with care and consid-
ered in the fullest extent."
86
Because the court put judicial dictum and the decisive issue of the case on
the same level, there is no real fundamental difference between stare decisis
and law of the case. Hence, cases establishing the law of the case doctrine
should have followed the principles outlined in Linn v. Minor. If the court is to
be consistent, there is no reason why the case at bar deserves stricter treatment
regarding principles of departure than future cases with similar issues. Law of
the case should not apply in erroneous decisions.
B. The Family Feud Continued
The debate regarding the integrity of law of the case continued in Hotel
Riviera, Inc. v. Short,87 wherein the majority held to its nineteenth century
roots.88 Upon reversal of summary judgment for defendants on a particular
theory of law, the trial continued on remand and a jury awarded compensatory
and punitive damages for plaintiff.89 Defendants appealed.90 The court found
that the facts remained substantially the same from the summary judgment rul-
ing to the end of the trial.91
On appeal, defendants claimed, inter alia, that the rule of law adopted
from the appeal of the summary judgment was erroneous and should be over-
ruled.92 Plaintiff responded stating, "the prior ruling was not so 'clearly and
palpably erroneous' and the alleged error was not 'so unjust' as to justify this
court to reverse the ruling in that decision."93 The plaintiff largely based his
argument on stare decisis principles from the cases cited in the opinion.94 The
plaintiff s counsel improvidently equated Nevada law pertaining to stare decisis
with law of the case, conceding that the court may have power to overrule a
prior decision in the same case. 95 Fortunately, for the plaintiff, the court better
1976); Molino v. Asher, 618 P.2d 878 (Nev. 1980); Andolino v. State, 662 P.2d 631 (Nev.
1983); State v. Alper, 706 P.2d 139 (Nev. 1985).
86 150 P.2d at 1019 (quoting in part 1 BOUVIER's LAW DICTIONARY 83 (3d ed.)).
87 396 P.2d 855 (Nev. 1964).
88 Id.
89 Id. at 856.
9 Id.
91 Id. at 856.
92 Id. at 859.
93 Id. at 861.
94 Id.
95 Id.
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understood the Nevada doctrine and held in his favor.9 6 Distinguishing law of
the case from stare decisis, the court commented, "[t]his weight falls even more
heavily in the present case, for our ruling in the previous case became the law
of this case."97 Apparently, the court loosely interpreted the strict construction
of Wright I, as it seemed to describe the difference between stare decisis and
law of the case as only a matter of degree.
The dissent, written by Justice Thompson, criticized the majority's use of
law of the case. Justice Thompson argued that the doctrine "should never be
invoked to require the perpetuation of error."9 8 He continued, "[a] court need
not be ashamed to acknowledge its mistake and correct it before damage
results. Though embarrassing, it is the only honorable course."99 The argu-
ment was of course, nothing new. Peculiar to Justice Thompson's approach,
however, was that for the first time since Wright I, an often-cited publication
supported the argument. This publication, written by E.H. Schopler, was an
annotation entitled, Erroneous Decision As Law of the Case On Subsequent
Appellate Review." This annotation contained the divergent views regarding
law of the case, and especially important, the numerous jurisdictions' departure
from the no power theory."° t If the court in 1895 adopted the no power theory
because of federal and sister court recognition, the Nevada Supreme Court
should not continue with the antiquated no power theory in light of a majority
shift to a less rigid standard.
96 Id. at 861-62.
97 Id. at 866.
98 Id. (Thompson, J., dissenting).
99 Id. at 866 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
100 See supra note 6.
101 The Annotation explains the divergent views in some detail. The following excerpt por-
trays the Nevada interpretation.
On the one hand are cases which hold the doctrine of the law of the case applicable, irrespective
of whether the decision on the former appeal is right or wrong, and apply this rule even in
situations in which the court, upon the later appeal, specifically finds or strongly intimates that
the decision on the former appeal was erroneous. Cases of this kind express the view that the
doctrine of the law of the case is inflexible, that an appellate court, having lost its jurisdiction
over the case and its former decision constituting a final adjudication, has no power to revise its
own decision on a former appeal, that this decision is "res judicata," and that the only remedy
available to correct the error is a petition for rehearing seasonably made after the decision on the
former appeal.
Id. § 3(a).
The argument on the other side is that law of the case is more of a principle of adher-
ence than a principle of estoppel. Notice from the following excerpt how law of the case
better resembles stare decisis than res judicata.
[T]he doctrine of the law of the case as applied to appellate courts is not an inexorable or abso-
lute command, and not inflexible; that the doctrine is founded upon expediency, and not upon the
principle of estoppel by former adjudication, and is subject to exceptions. Under this view the
doctrine of the law of the case, as applied to appellate courts on successive appeals, is a mere
rule of practice, but not a limitation on the courts' power. It is, however, recognized that an
appellate court's power to depart from its own ruling on a former appeal may be invoked not as a
matter of right, but of grace and discretion, and should be exercised only sparingly or rarely, and
for cogent reasons, after careful consideration of the situation involved in individual cases, or,
more specifically, in a clear case under extraordinary or exceptional circumstances, in the inter-
est of justice.
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C. A More Detailed Argument Or Different Facts?
An appellant losing on the first appeal may try to refine the issue or some-
how bolster the argument for another try at the court. This occurred in Hall v.
State, 10 2 where the defendant in a murder case cleverly raised the issue of lack
of competence to enter a guilty plea a second time. In the first appeal, the court
found the defendant competent to enter a plea.' 0 3 In the second appeal, the
defense failed to apprise the court of the previous hearing as required by
Nevada Revised Statute 177.335."° On appeal from his denial of petition for
post-conviction relief, the defense fine-tuned the competence argument.105
Having discovered the first appeal, the court barred the issue, and held that
"lt]he doctrine of the law of the case cannot be avoided by a more detailed and
precisely focused argument subsequently made after reflection upon the previ-
ous proceedings. '
This case may appear trivial, but it introduced an important element in
Nevada law of the case. The defendant did not add facts or evidence or argue
different issues on the second appeal; instead, defendant placed more emphasis
on an issue already argued in the first appeal. "The law of the first appeal is the
law of the case on all subsequent appeals in which the facts are substantially the
same." 1
0 7
This leaves the question of whether new facts are barred under law of the
case. The Nevada Supreme Court examined this issue in Paine v. State,"°8 in
which Paine was convicted of murder in two robbery operations. Paine killed a
cab driver and wounded another."o The court decided on the first appeal that
Paine committed murder at random and without apparent motive, which the
court found an aggravating circumstance for capital punishment purposes."o
On the second appeal, Paine argued that "new evidence" adduced at the second
penalty hearing indicated that the murders were necessary to accomplish the
robberies."'' Hence, no aggravating circumstances should carry." 2 The court
found that the new evidence fell under law of the case principles because the
new evidence "[was] not substantially different from that which was introduced
at the first penalty hearing."" ' 3 Accordingly, the court found that it "need not
reconsider" the issue." 4
102 535 P.2d 797 (Nev. 1975).
103 Id. at 798.
1o4 Id. at 798 & n.1. NEV. REV. STAT. 177.335 (1991) repealed by Acts 1991, ch. 44, § 31,
p. 92 (at the time stating in pertinent part, "The petition must identify any previous state or
federal court proceedings taken by the petitioner to secure relief from his conviction or
sentence").
105 Hall, 535 P.2d at 798.
106 Id. at 799.
1o7 Id. at 798 (quoting Walker v. State, 455 P.2d 34 (Nev. 1969)).
1o8 877 P.2d 1025 (Nev. 1994).
109 Id. at 1026-27.
11o Id. at 1026.
Il Id. at 1028.
112 Id. at 1028-29.
113 Id. at 1029.
114 Id. As pertaining to "new evidence," law of the case does not control. Usually newly
discovered evidence is only allowed under Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 60 on motion at
the trial judge's discretion. New facts argued on appeal are generally not allowed because
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D. Inconsistencies in the Doctrine
The Paine court's consideration of the substantially similar facts element
is not the only principle derived from the case. It also presents a clear break
from prior rulings on the law of the case doctrine and, therefore, provides a
segway into some of the inconsistencies the Nevada Supreme Court introduced
into the doctrine. After ruling on the "new evidence" issue, the court elected to
revisit prior issues of the case because of the gravity of Paine's sentence." 5
The court, notwithstanding its reservations about weakening the doctrine,
decided to revisit an issue even though it supposedly had no power to do so." 6
In so doing, the court departed from its long-standing no power theory.
In its later cases, the court engaged in efforts almost simultaneously to (1)
uphold the integrity of the no power doctrine and (2) ignore departures from the
doctrine. In addition, the court struggled with law of the case, a judicially
created doctrine, and legislatively enacted procedural bars. Interestingly, the
legislative procedural bars provide exceptions for departure while law of the
case does not.' 7 In a very convoluted case, the court provided examples of
these phenomena.
1. Lozada v. State
In Lozada v. State," 8 a jury convicted Lozada of four controlled substance
violations.1" 9 Lozada failed to perfect an appeal.' 20 Subsequently, Lozada
filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the state district court, arguing that
his counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him of the right to appeal.12 1
The district court denied Lozada's petition and the Nevada Supreme Court dis-
missed his subsequent appeal.' 2 2 Lozada then filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in the federal district court.1 23 After his petition failed in the Ninth
Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded to the Ninth
Circuit because two circuits recognized a presumption of prejudice in Lozada's
case. 124 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the U.S. Supreme Court that prejudice
is presumed when a petitioner establishes that counsel's failure to file a notice
the appellate court cannot look outside the record. Carson Ready Mix, Inc. v. First Nat'l
Bank, 635 P.2d 276, 277 (Nev. 1981).
"-' Paine, 877 P.2d at 1029.
116 Id. at 1028-29.
l7 NEV. REv. STAT. 34.810(2) (1985) provides: "a second or successive petition must be
dismissed if ... the prior determination was on the merits or, if new and different grounds
are alleged, the judge or justice finds that the failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds
in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ." Id. § 34.810(3) requires petitioners to
establish good cause for rearguing issues that have been rejected on their merits in a previous
petition. NEV. REV. STAT. 34.726(1) (1991) requires good cause for failing to file a petition
within one year of the final resolution of the direct appeal, or conviction if no appeal was
taken.
118 871 P.2d 944 (Nev. 1994).
119 Id. at 945.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
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of appeal was without the petitioner's consent. 25 The Ninth Circuit remanded
to the federal district court for a determination of whether Lozada's trial coun-
sel failed to pursue an appeal without Lozada's consent. 12 6 Lozada filed a
notice of appeal in the Nevada Supreme Court pursuant to the instructions of
the federal district court. The court found that it lacked jurisdiction on
Lozada's direct appeal because the notice of appeal was filed well after the
thirty-day appeal period prescribed by Nevada Rule of Appellate Procedure
4(b) (despite the Ninth Circuit's offer to allow a delayed appeal). 127 However,
the court decided to change its ruling on the appeal of the petition for post-
conviction based on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision. 1 8 The court noted,
however, that the appellant must first overcome certain procedural bars to be
able to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus (post-conviction) in the district
court.' 29 Each required a showing of good cause for the successive or belated
issues.' ° The court stated that Lozada met the good cause requirement:
Because Lozada filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, his claim of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel was properly presented to the district court. If that claim
had merit, the denial of relief by the district court, and the subsequent denial of relief
by this court, would constitute an impediment external to the defense that would
excuse appellant's default in presenting the same claim in a successive petition.
Therefore, we must determine whether appellant presented a viable claim for relief in
his petition for post-conviction relief. 13'
Law of the case doctrine is not mentioned at all in the court's opinion."'
If the court had applied its construction of the law of the case doctrine, Lozada
would not have been able to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus (post-
conviction) in the district court. 133 The first decision made on the appeal of the
petition for post-conviction relief must stand according to the Nevada law of
the case doctrine.134
It is entirely inconsistent in law to provide a detour around legislative
procedural bars for good cause while the court leaves its judicially created pro-
cedural bar without exception. Only by not considering one could the court
reconcile the two. The Lozada court may have chosen the favorable statutory
procedural bars over the judicial doctrine because of the formers' flexibility. In
this way, the court could hold tight to its rigid construction for the doctrine law
of the case, but limit its scope to cases it deemed proper.
Limits in the doctrine's applicability came not only from arbitrary deci-
sions like Lozada, but also from restrictions on who may invoke the doctrine.
In Winston, 13 the court held that as long as a court has absolute jurisdiction
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 945-46.
128 Id. at 946.
129 id. at 946; see NEv. REv. STAT. 34.810(2), 34.810(3), and 34.726.
130 Lozada, 871 P.2d at 946.
131 Id. at 946.
132 Id. passim.
133 Cf Mazzan v. Whitley, 921 P.2d 920 (Nev. 1996) (equating law of the case with the
statutory procedural bars allowing both an exception for a showing of "good cause").
134 See Wright 1, 39 P. 872, 873-74 (introducing the no power theory).
135 9 Nev. 71 (1873).
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over an issue, its decision is the law of the case from which even a higher court
cannot deviate. This did not mean that the higher courts had no jurisdiction for
appellate review. But Winston stood for the proposition that higher courts'
review was restricted to certain appellate functions. 136 At that time, Nevada
law of the case had not fully developed and the issue of its applicability
lingered. Did law of the case apply to horizontal and vertical appellate court
treatment, binding the subsequent appellate court and the trial court below? Or
could law of the case bind horizontal trial courts as well? 37 Would the court
cling to its ruling in Winston, where a trial court binds an appellate court? The
language employed in Wright I, provided clues on this issue. The court stated
that the "ruling of an appellate court" is a "final adjudication."' 3 8 Did that
statement overrule Winston?
2. McKague v. Whitley
The scope of law of the case remained an issue until McKague v.
Whitley. 13 9 In that case, a jury convicted McKague of murder and he was
sentenced to death.' 4 ° McKague appealed and the court affirmed the convic-
tion.14 1 He then filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the district court
arguing ineffective assistance of counsel.' 42 The district court denied the peti-
tion and McKague's counsel failed to perfect an appeal of the denied peti-
tion.' 4 3  Thereafter, the court dismissed McKague's untimely appeal.
' 44
McKague filed another post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus.' 4 5
The district court dismissed the petition with prejudice invoking law of the case
doctrine. 14 6 On appeal from that decision, the court held that the doctrine is
136 Id. at 75.
137 For an elaborate article on the application of law of the case in various court settings see
Vestal, supra note 39. In his article, Professor Vestal first discussed an appellate court
binding an inferior court. Id. at 5. In such cases, the higher court's mandate carries the
strictest requirement of observance. Id. The lower court generally has no power to deviate
from the instructions given. Id. In this situation, problems generally do not arise other than
deciphering the instructions to be followed or an inconsistent mandate. Id. at 6-10. Next, he
covered an appellate court binding itself. Id. at 10. As discussed previously, there are two
prevailing views: one favoring the no power theory and the other interpreting law of the
case as a flexible rule of adherence. Next, he discussed a trial court binding a trial court. Id.
at 10-11. Some courts treat horizontal authority at the lower level as binding. Id. at 15.
However, most courts view the first trial court's decision non-binding to a subsequent trial
court on the same issues. Id. A number of variables shape this view: "(1) whether there has
been an intervening, inconsistent or controlling decision; (2) whether the same or different
judge is involved; (3) whether rehearing en banc is authorized." Id. at 15. Finally, he dis-
cussed the anomalous inferior court binding an appellate court. Id. at 20. These situations
involve lack of objection in the lower court or improper appellate review of the issues. In
other words, the lower court has general jurisdiction and the remedy sought by appellant is
not an appellant remedy. See Ex pane Winston, 9 Nev. 71 (1893) discussed in text.
138 Wright 1, 39 P. 872, 874 (Nev. 1895).
139 912 P.2d 255 (Nev. 1996).
140 Id. at 256.
141 Id.
142 Id.
'43 Id.
'44 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
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inapplicable to horizontal trial court decisions "because only appellate court
decisions may constitute the law of the case."' 147 However, the court stressed
that trial court decisions are still given weight because statutory procedural bars
are applicable in such cases. 48
The result achieved in McKague is inconsistent with Lozada. Why did the
court stress overcoming the statutory procedural bars in Lozada's case without
considering the equally weighted judicial procedural bar of law of the case?
Unlike McKague, Lozada involved an appellate court decision. Some explana-
tions are possible. Either law of the case was purposefully omitted from
inquiry in Lozada in the interests of efficiency or the court did not think to
consider employing the doctrine to the facts of the case. However, a third more
remote explanation is possible. Perhaps the court was attempting to steer away
from its rigid construction to a more liberal view of law of the case. Consider
the following cases.
3. Murray v. State
In Murray v. State,149 a jury convicted Murray on two counts of attempted
robbery with the use of a deadly weapon. " Murray then filed a direct appeal,
which the court dismissed.' 5 ' Murray filed a post-conviction petition for a writ
of habeas in the district court challenging the sentence.' 52 The district court
found merit in Murray's claim and "remanded" to its fellow district court to re-
sentence Murray.' 5 3 The court of remand refused to alter the sentence and
Murray appealed.154 On appeal, the state argued that Murray's claim was
barred under law of the case because it involved a decided issue - the validity
of Murray's sentence.' 5 5 The court held on the earlier appeal that Murray's
sentence was "within the statutory limits,' 156 but refused to apply law of the
case for two reasons. First, the issue apparently was not entirely the same as
argued on the second appeal.' 5 7 Second, and more interesting, a case decided
117 Id. at 259 (emphasis added).
148 Id. at 259-60.
14 803 P.2d 225 (Nev. 1990).
5o Id. at 226.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
"I Id. This decision pre-dated McKrague. Perhaps the district court did not feel law of the
case bound it to the decision of its fellow court. The law proved inconclusive as yet on this
issue. If law of the case did weigh against the court, on "remand" several factors are rele-
vant according to Professor Vestal: "the distaste judges have for repeated work which has
already been done; the general respect that one judge has for another; [and] the desire for
stability in the law." Vestal, supra note 39, at 16-17. In this case, however, the first district
court has no power to remand to a fellow district court so law of the case is inapplicable.
Murray v. State, 803 P.2d 225, 226 (Nev. 1990). In a dissenting opinion in a case written by
Justice Springer, a district judge reconsidered and overruled a prior district judge's decision.
Masonry & Title Contractors Ass'n of S. Nev. v. Jolley, Urga, & Wirth, Ltd., 941 P.2d 486
(Nev. 1997) (Springer, J., dissenting). The judge refused to adhere to law of the case
because, according to the judge, the decision was clearly erroneous. Id. at 492. Ironically,
the judge was clearly erroneous in his interpretation of Nevada law of the case!
155 Murray, 803 P.2d at 226.
156 Id.
157 Id.
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between Murray's first appeal and his second appeal offered clarity or, in the
court's words, "explained the law."' 5 8 Arguably then, a decision of law fixed
between two appeals in a case, not appertaining to the case or its proceedings,
might offer clarifying or explanatory rules that govern the second appeal.' 59
This rationale sounds too much like the law of the case as a principle of adher-
ence as opposed to the no power theory of Nevada law of the case.' 60 A shift
was occurring. Applying this rationale to the hypothetical illustrated in the
Introduction, Lenny might argue on a second appeal that "explanatory law"
changed the result on the hearsay issue and, therefore, the court should recon-
sider the issue. This result might defeat a practical efficiency interest, but it
favors the right decision.
4. Mazzan v. Whitley
In Mazzan v. Whitley, 6 ' the court continued to find exception to law of
the case. In 1979, Mazzan was convicted of murder and sentenced to death.
16 2
Several petitions and appeals followed this conviction.' 63 The court noted it
had already decided a few of Mazzan's assertions in previous proceedings.'
1
The court then introduced the normal statutory bars like the ones used in
Lozada and other cases, namely Nevada Revised Statute 34.810(2) and (3). 165
These statutes require a showing of good cause. 16 6 Mixed in with these stat-
utes, the court injected law of the case doctrine as an additional procedural
element Mazzan must overcome. 167 Not present in the discussion, however,
are any distinguishing factors from these statutory bars and law of the case.
168
It appeared from the reading that Mazzan overcame all his procedural hurdles
by a showing of "good cause."
' 16 9
E. Summary of Nevada Points on Law of the Case
From the foregoing analysis of the history of law of the case, several
points about the Nevada doctrine are apparent. A list of these points will facili-
tate the following section entitled Criticism and An Alternative Route.
158 Id. at 227.
159 Indeed, if two cases are positioned on the same point of law but with inconsistent results
and without significantly varied facts, it would seem quite logical that "neither is the law of
the case." Greene v. Rothschild, 402 P.2d 356 (Wash. 1966) (citing Gage v. Downey, 29 P.
635 (Cal. 1892)); In re Estate of Walker, 181 P. 792 (Cal. 1919) (emphasis in original).
16o Cf Barrett v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1987); Counsel of Alternative Political
Parties v. Hooks, 179 F.3d 64 (3d Cir. 1999).
161 921 P.2d 920 (Nev. 1996).
162 Id. at 920.
163 Id. at 920-21.
164 Id. at 922.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id. Note the similarity produced in this case and Lozada. However, the Lozada court
failed to implicate law of the case while Mazzan did.
168 Id. passim.
169 Id. at 922.
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1) Nevada courts associated law of the case with res judicata under princi-
ples of estoppel as opposed to stare decisis under principles of correct
application of rules.' 7 o
2) Nevada courts adopted the no power theory of law of the case, mean-
ing, once the court rules it cannot depart from that prior rule except
upon a motion for rehearing. 7 '
3) The scope of law of the case in Nevada is limited to only appellate
decisions. 172
4) Law of the case applies to any issue on appeal properly raised, deliber-
ated, and decided. 1
73
5) Nevada law of the case cannot be avoided by a more detailed and pre-
cisely focused argument subsequently made after reflection upon the
previous proceedings.
174
6) Law of the case applies to all issues where the facts are substantially
the same.' 75
III. CRITICISM AND AN ALTERNATIVE ROUTE
This section of the note will compare the law of the case doctrine in
Nevada with the current federal framework. As the court adopted the "no
power theory" from outside cases back in 1895, it is appropriate now to con-
trast the Nevada view with current cases. In Wright I, the court stated that it
looked to the opinions of its sister courts, federal courts, and the U.S. Supreme
Court. A complete analysis calls for comparison of the Nevada interpretation
with those jurisdictions from which Nevada adopted its interpretation. How-
ever, for sake of brevity and to facilitate concentration on current doctrine, this
note will limit comparison to the current federal framework.
One might argue the significance of equating law of the case to res judi-
cata or stare decisis. These doctrines indeed share similar characteristics and
are sometimes confused with one another.' 76 Generally speaking, however,
courts that adopt the no power theory associate law of the case to res judicata, a
strict preclusion doctrine blind to any hindsight. 177 On the other hand, other
170 Cartan v. David, 4 P. 61 (Nev. 1884); Wright 1, 39 P. 872 (Nev. 1895).
171 Wright 1, 39 P. 872; State v. Loveless, 150 P.2d 1015 (Nev. 1944).
172 McKague v. Whitley, 912 P.2d 255 (Nev. 1996).
173 Loveless, 150 P.2d 1015.
174 Hall v. State, 535 P.2d 797 (Nev. 1975).
175 Wright 1, 39 P. 872; Walker v. State, 455 P.2d 34 (Nev. 1969).
176 In Swanson v. Swanson, 5 P.3d 973 (Idaho 2000), the court equated law of the case to
stare decisis. The court, speaking of law of the case noted, "[l]ike stare decisis it protects
against relitigation of settled issues." Id. at 977. This equation is disingenuous to principles
of stare decisis since a court may decide the issue mistakenly on the first appeal. Such a case
is not settled. Idaho is one of the few states like Nevada that adhere to the no power theory.
The court should have related its interpretation of law of the case to res judicata.
177 See supra note 16; see also United States v. ITT Rayonier, 627 F.2d 996, 1004 (9th Cir.
1980) ("The doctrine of res judicata does not depend on whether the prior judgment was free
of error. If it did, judgments would lack finality, the very rationale of the rule of res judi-
cata.") (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940)); Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257,
270 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("[T]he doctrine of the law of the case, unlike res judicata but like stare
decisis, does not preclude reconsideration of erroneous decisions.").
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courts view law of the case as a rule of adherence, like stare decisis, allowing
departure under certain circumstances.' 7 8
In the classic case, Linn v. Minor, the court left the following instruction:
"whenever a court is called upon to depart from a prior determination" it must
take into account "all improvements in the science of the law."1 7 9 However,
only a few years later the court failed to follow that instruction and instead
followed a path set by other jurisdictions.' 8 ° The court in Wright I and other
decisions characterized law of the case as kin to res judicata.' 8 '
Law of the case ought to operate more like stare decisis. It cannot act like
res judicata since the doctrine is not limited to decisive issues. Law of the case
extends to a multitude of issues presented, deliberated, and decided in one
case.' 82 To mandate strict preclusionary effect to all these issues is an uncom-
fortable prospect. A court might be prone to lackadaisically dismiss a collateral
issue with little forethought if it is not the determinative issue. This does not
mean that all judicial dictum of the Nevada Supreme Court is flagrantly cur-
sory. But, given the court's extremely pressing burden, overlooking a few col-
lateral issues is not an implausible occurrence.
183
The Loveless court cautioned that a decision is only authority if "there was
an application of the judicial mind to the precise question adjudged; and that
the point was investigated with care and considered in the fullest extent."' 8 4
Does that mean that only carefully considered judicial dictum is binding under
law of the case? Is the issue of "careful consideration" a presumption, an
irrebuttable presumption? If law of the case extends to a multitude of issues, a
power of departure is warranted. Law of the case ought to operate like stare
decisis. Its overreaching effect should demand flexibility. In this way, law of
the case and stare decisis share the same aim, to ensure a consistent body of
law. For example, the hypothetical in the Introduction would allow Lenny to
reargue the issue of hearsay before the court. This result is sound since the
litigant in the intervening case received beneficial treatment on the issue.
In addition to this noted exception to law of the case, the case law is
replete with categorical exceptions including allowing departure when a past
decision is erroneous or would work a manifest injustice.'8 5 These cases fully
178 Schopler, supra note 6, § 3(a) and cases cited therein; see also, Steinman, supra note 1,
at 598-99 nn.8-10.
179 4 Nev. 462, 466-67 (1868).
180 State v. Loveless, 150 P.2d 1015, 1018 (Nev. 1944).
'I Ild. at 1017-18; Wright 1, 39 P. 872 (Nev. 1895).
182 Loveless, 150 P.2d at 1019.
183 There is no doubt that Nevada is one of the fastest growing states in America. Conse-
quently, litigation in Nevada is on the rise. In a matter of just five years, cases appealed to
the Nevada Supreme Court increased dramatically. Susan Wilson, Proper Person Litigation
In The Nevada Supreme Court, 6 NEV. LAW. 24 (1998). A growing state provides an addi-
tional reason to abandon the no power theory. Within a matter of time, Nevada may aug-
ment its court system with intermediate appellate courts. Complications may ensue
regarding applicability of the law of the case doctrine. See Greene v. Rothschild, 402 P.2d
356 (Wash. 1966) (citing Note, Law of the Case, 5 STAN L. REV. 751 (1953)).
"8 Loveless, 150 P.2d at 1019.
185 Steinman, supra note 1, at 599; Schopler, supra note 6, § 6 and cases cited therein.
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elaborate why efficiency must capitulate to accuracy.186 A quick review of
such decisions extols the reasons behind the rule.
Most if not all federal jurisdictions hold to the view that law of the case is
not an "inexorable command." '87 Perhaps one of the most respected and foun-
dational cases espousing this view is White v. Murtha.188 There, the court
faced the question of whether it should adhere to a former decision. In review-
ing the case law pertaining to law of the case, it summarized the competing
principles as follows:
The "law of the case" rule is based on the salutary and sound public policy that
litigation should come to an end. It is predicated on the premise that "there would be
no end to a suit if every obstinate litigant could, by repeated appeals, compel a court
to listen to criticisms on their opinions or speculate of chances from changes in its
members," and that it would be impossible for an appellate court "to perform its
duties satisfactorily and efficiently" and expeditiously "if a question, once considered
and decided by it were to be litigated anew in the same case upon any and every
subsequent appeal" thereof. While the "law of the case" doctrine is not an inexorable
command, a decision of a legal issue or issues by an appellate court establishes the
"law of the case" and must be followed in all subsequent proceedings in the same
case in the trial court or on a later appeal in the appellate court, unless the evidence
on a subsequent trial was substantially different, controlling authority has since made
a contrary decision of the law applicable to such issues, or the decision was clearly
erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. 1 89
This interpretation of the doctrine is found in many recent federal court
opinions. 19° The Second Circuit takes an even more relaxed approach to the
doctrine.19 1 In Rezzonico v. H & R Block, Inc.,' 92 the court explained that law
of the case is a discretionary doctrine and not a mandatory one. The doctrine
applies, according to the court, absent "cogent or compelling" reasons.' 93 This
is by far the most liberal approach to law of the case as it vests the court with
room for reason; however, the majority of circuits limit departure to the catego-
ries established in Murtha.194
This interpretation is a far cry from Nevada's strict construction. Nevada
saw fit long ago to adopt the current interpretation; it is now years behind the
186 Schopler, supra note 6, § 6 and cases cited therein.
187 See, e.g., Craft v. United States, 233 F.3d 358, 363 (6th Cir. 2000); Greene v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 210 F.3d 1237, 1241 (10th Cir. 2000).
188 377 F.2d 428, 431 (5th Cir. 1967).
189 Id. at 431-32.
190 United States v. Paquette, 201 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 2000); Counsel of Alternative Political
Parties v. Hooks, 179 F.3d 64 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Aramony, 166 F.3d 655 (4th
Cir. 1998); Gates v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 881 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1989); Holloway v. Brush,
220 F.3d 767 (6th Cir. 2000); Creek v. Vill. of Westhaven, 144 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 1998);
Little Earth of United Tribes, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 807 F.2d 1433 (8th
Cir. 1986); Coleman v. Calderon, 210 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2000); Greene v. Safeway Stores,
Inc., 210 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2000); Royal Ins. Co. v. Latin Am. Aviation Serv., Inc., 210
F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2000); Gould, Inc. v. United States, 67 F.3d 925 (Fed. Cir. 1995);
Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 199 F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605
(1983).
191 Steinman, supra note 1, at 614-15.
192 182 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 1999).
193 Id. at 149.
194 See cases cited in supra note 185.
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existing view in the federal system. Nevada should adopt the Murtha view.
Adoption of the categorical exceptions presented in Murtha would require
Nevada to overturn the no power theory, but such a sacrifice is justified. In
fact, adopting the Murtha categorical exceptions to law of the case will harmo-
nize the law of the case doctrine with Murray, Mazzan, and Lozada.
The first categorical exception in Murtha is that law of the case does not
apply if controlling authority has since made contrary decisions.' 9 5 If a deci-
sion on a first appeal is altered, clarified, or changed by intervening law,1 96 and
the second appellate decision factors in the intervening law, harmony is struck
producing a general consistency in the law. Applying this principle to Murray,
the court could have changed its decision on the second appeal with Odoms v.
State,19 7 an intervening decision, regardless of whether law of the case pre-
cluded the issue. Here, the Murtha exception applies. The court decided that
the issue presented on the second appeal differed from the first justifying a
departure from the doctrine.' 9 8 But had the issue been the same, under the
Murtha exception, the court could follow the Odoms decision. Conversely,
under the no power theory, the court could not account for the intervening
Odoms decision if the issue presented in the first appeal is substantially similar
to the second appeal. Therefore, to ensure consistency in the Nevada case law,
Nevada courts should overrule the no power theory in favor of the Murtha
exception.
The second Murtha categorical exception to law of the case provides for
departure from the doctrine if adherence would result in an erroneous decision
or work a manifest injustice.' 9 9 This principle echoes the underlying theory of
overruling the wrong decision in stare decisis. The Nevada Supreme Court
decisions of Lozada and Mazzan apply these principles in direct violation of
Nevada's law of the case interpretation. In Lozada, the court did not mention
law of the case, yet changed a prior decision because it reached the incorrect
result.2° In Mazzan, the court mentioned law of the case, yet applied the doc-
trine because plaintiff failed to show "good cause" for disregarding the doc-
trine. In both cases, the Nevada legislature drafted procedural bars, and in so
doing, created an exception upon a showing of "good cause. 2 °1 If the Nevada
Supreme Court will adopt the Murtha exceptions, harmony would not only
result in the case law, but also between the Nevada Supreme Court and the
Nevada Legislature. Good cause would allow the court to depart from an erro-
neous ruling. The court must overrule the no power theory. Otherwise, a con-
tinual friction between the legislature and the court will prevail.
195 377 F.2d at 431-32 (5th Cir. 1967).
196 See, e.g., Barrett v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Hooks, 179 F.3d
64.
' 714 P.2d 568 (Nev. 1986).
198 Murray v. State, 803 P.2d 225, 226 (Nev. 1990).
199 377 F.2d at 431-42.
200 871 P.2d at 944.
201 See supra note 117.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Nevada should restructure law of the case to account for recent develop-
ments in the doctrine. The old theory is outdated. The Nevada Supreme Court
adopted the "no power theory" of law of the case as a result of existing case
law prevalent at the time from various jurisdictions, including the federal cir-
cuits. Since then the entire federal system changed its scheme to discount the
no power theory. Categorical exceptions employed by the federal courts pro-
vide a practical solution to the unforgiving result of the no power theory. If a
decision on the first appeal is changed, altered, or clarified by an intervening
decision, or if the first decision on the case is clearly wrong or works a manifest
injustice, law of the case should not hold to perpetuate error. Therefore, the
Nevada Supreme Court should apply the Murtha categorical exceptions. In
doing so, the court will provide not only a workable standard, but also ensure
the integrity of the law of the case remains well within defined limits.
